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Solving Meno's Puzzle, Defeating Merlin's 
Subterfuge: Bodies of Reference Knowledge 
and Archaeological Inference 
LUANN W ANDSNIDER 
THE MIND OF Lewis Binford is nimble and constantly evolving. In part, one 
can map Binford's prodigious intellectual growth by looking at the research 
trajectories of his students, who often continue on paths they began under 
his tutelage. In my case, certainly, this is very true. When I arrived at the 
University of New Mexico in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Binford was 
exploring the nature of the archaeological record: how to understand past 
human organization at a supra-ethnographic scale, what we might learn 
from bones and site structure, and how to reliably give meaning to the 
archaeological record. This chapter, harking back to the early 1980s, fo-
cuses on the latter and attempts to organize some of the many thoughts that 
have been offered on the notion initially known as middle-range theory. 
Fundamental questions in archaeology are: What is it? How old is it? 
Why did people make it? Why did they stop making it? What do these 
patterns in artifacts, structures, and so forth mean at a deeper level? When 
students of archaeology ask and answer these questions, they are con-
fronted with Meno's Puzzle and Merlin's subterfuge. 
Meno was the imaginary debater with whom Plato puzzled over the 
detection of Virtue (Evans 1995). If we knew how to recognize Virtue in a 
person, then we could and would do so. But, if Virtue's distinguishing 
characteristics are a mystery to us, how will we recognize a virtuous indi-
vidual when one appears? Mark Twain's Merlin, the resident magician in 
King Arthur's court, was capable of discerning activities happening at great 
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distances, even 10,000 miles away. Shockingly, however, Merlin could not 
reckon the contents of the Connecticut Yankee's pocket, though both were 
located in the same room (Dunnell 1992; Gould 1978; Twain 1917). 
Meno's Puzzle and Merlin's subterfuge have, in various guises, been 
visited by archaeologists (Ascher 1961; Binford 1967, 1968, 1977b, 1980, 
1981, 1987a; Butler 1965; Clarke 1978; Dunnell 1982; Gould 1978; Gould 
and Watson 1982; Lowther 1962; Shott 1998; Sullivan 1978; Trigger 1995; 
Tschauner 1996; Wylie 1982, 1985, 1989a, 1989b, 1992a, 1992b, 1996) 
and others (Gould 1965) with some frequency over the last several decades, 
for they engage the heart of the matter of validly learning something about 
a past that had virtues perhaps very different from those familiar to us. In 
the archaeological literature, Meno's Puzzle appears as the methodological 
paradox (Binford 1977b:3; Ramenofsky and Steffen 1998:3), while Mer-
lin's subterfuge is concerned with the validity of knowledge claims about a 
past "10,000 miles" distant. 
In archaeology, three related problems surface. First, without traveling 
back in time, how can we really know what the past was like? Second, can 
we learn about the past without imposing the present on the past (Wobst 
1978)? That is, can the past somehow speak for itself and tell us something 
different than we think we already know? Finally, assuming that we can 
learn about the past, how do we know those knowledge claims are secure? 
Lewis Binford (1962) answered the first question in 1962 by noting that 
the archaeological record is a contemporary phenomenon and that from it 
we derive inferences about what the past was like. Middle-range theory was 
part of the solution to both Meno's Puzzle and Merlin's subterfuge and the 
answer to the final two questions offered by Binford (1977b; 1981) in the 
late 1970s. As initially articulated by Binford, middle-range theory had 
several necessary attributes. First, it defined an unambiguous relationship 
between enduring, material archaeological phenomenon and a generating 
condition or process. Second, this relationship had to be uniformitarian in 
nature, that is, occurring in the past, which we hope to learn about, as well 
in the present, where it could be understood and documented. Moreover, it 
had to be warrantable as such. And it had to be independent of ideas about 
the past one hoped to evaluate, and thus could be used in an instrumen-
tal fashion to infer the occurrence of past processes from observations 
on patterned contemporary archaeological phenomena. Binford described 
middle-range theory as the Rosetta Stone to the archaeological record and 
as a means for linking the bear footprint of a physical record and the bear in 
the dynamic systemic realm. In this way it offered a robust, independent 
observational language with which to describe the archaeological record 
and interpret it in terms of past conditions (Binford 1981:25). 
Since its introduction, the concept of middle-range theory has been 
ignored, maligned, critiqued, and revised (Shott 1998). While Shott finds 
middle-range theory to be paid short shrift in archaeology today, it is clear 
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that both past (Grayson 1986) and present archaeological practice neces-
sarily depends on a construct that, in the inferential process, behaves like 
Binford's middle-range theory, whether it is labeled as such or not. Indeed, 
recent researchers (e.g., (Hodder 1999; Tilley 1994; Trigger 1995; Tschauner 
1996) from diverse archaeological schools have come to acknowledge 
the critical role that such instruments have for constructing defensible ar-
chaeological interpretation, even using the term "middle-range theory" to 
describe this inferential tool. The middle-range theory actually used by 
many researchers, however, strays rather far from the ideal laid out by 
Binford in the late 1970s, as discussed below. 
More recently, Binford (2001a, 2001b) has retreated somewhat from 
aspects of middle-range theory as described in the 1970s, but also moved 
beyond it. While not naming middle-range theory per se, he has decried the 
application of simple "diagnostic conventions" to complex archaeological 
interpretation. Binford (1987b, 2001a, 2001b) has introduced the term 
"frames of reference" to describe a learning process that organizes current, 
pertinent knowledge against which archaeological observations can be 
arrayed to further explication of archaeological variation. As elaborated 
upon especially in his volume, Constructing Frames of Reference: An An-
alytical Method for Archaeological Theory Building Using Ethnographic 
and Environmental Data Sets, such a learning strategy is essential for 
approaching the analysis and interpretation of second- and third-order 
archaeological units constructed from primary units of archaeological 
observation. 
In this chapter I revisit Meno's Puzzle and Merlin's subterfuge. I in-
troduce the term "bodies of reference knowledge" to describe the crucial 
element in the archaeological interpretative enterprise, a hermeneutic en-
terprise that also recognizes the archaeological record, the archaeological 
document (observations made on the record), ideas about the past we 
propose to evaluate archaeologically or which inform the construction of 
inferential tools, and interpretations of the past yielded by archaeological 
investigation and analysis. Bodies of reference knowledge may be usefully 
characterized along several different dimensions, as described below. Fol-
lowing from this dimensionalization are observations on how bodies of 
reference knowledge are applied. Elaboration of the archaeological inter-
pretative enterprise in this way allows us to approach a solution to Meno's 
Puzzle and defeat Merlin's subterfuge. 
BACKGROUND 
Shott (1998) has offered a comprehensive history of the notion of middle-
range theory in archaeology, especially focusing on the difference between 
Binfordian and Mertonian middle-range theory, which was also reflected 
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upon earlier by Raab and Goodyear (1984). But it is useful to situate Shott's 
history in the larger context of determining relevant archaeological obser-
vations and assigning secure meaning to those observations. 
In archaeology, there has been for some time an explicit concern for 
archaeological versions of Merlin's subterfuge and, later, Meno's Puzzle. 
Robert Ascher (1961) discoursed on the defensible use of ethnographic 
analogy to undergird archaeological interpretation, an issue later revisited 
by Gould and Watson (1982) and others (Murray and Walker 1988; Wylie 
1982). Lowther (1962) offered insights on what constitutes an archaeo-
logical fact and how the truth of such facts might be assessed, pointing to a 
conservative strategy that assessed new archaeological knowledge on the 
basis of its congruence with established knowledge. And Butler (1965) 
noted the role that prior knowledge, whether explicitly acknowledged or 
not, played in data collection and analysis. 
While archaeologists in the 1960s and 1970s consulted philosophers of 
science to find an escape from Merlin's conundrum (fritz and Plog 1970; 
Kelley and Hanen 1988; Watson et al. 1971, 1984), they soon realized the 
uniqueness of their situation (Wylie 1989b). Binford (1983:66-67) offers a 
graphic account of his recognition of the chasm between observations on 
archaeological materials, in his case from Combe Grenal, and interpreta-
tions of the Mousterian past. His 1970s solution to the problem, middle-
range theory, emerged over a decade and was presented in rationale and 
also operationally in Nunamiut Ethnoarchaeology (Binford 1978b), Bones: 
Ancient Men and Modern Myths (Binford 1981), and Faunal Remains from 
Klasies River Mouth (Binford 1984), as well as elsewhere (Binford 1978a, 
1980). 
Grayson (1986) points out that something like middle-range theory or 
middle-range research has long been part of archaeology, citing examples 
from the French Paleolithic and Great Basin discussion of eoliths. The 
1980s expansions in the development of middle-range interpretive tools he 
credits to an expansion in the recognition of interpretative ambiguities. 
More important than this, I think, is the seemingly simple act of labeling 
this aspect of the archaeological enterprise, which Binford and others (e.g., 
Watson's [1979] source- and subject-side knowledge) did, exposing 
archaeologists to this crucial-indeed, inescapable-step in constructing 
knowledge about the past. That is, Binford (and others, but especially 
Binford) made the implicit explicit, thereby making it something the dis-
cipline could discuss, digest, and move on programmatically. 
Wylie (1989b, 1992b, 1996) has highlighted another aspect of middle-
range theory that was raised in the early days of the conjoined processual/ 
postprocessual soliloquies, on objective versus relative observation. She 
cogently describes middle-range theory as the middle course steered be-
tween the shoals of a false objectivism and the reefs of a not very useful 
relativism. Archaeologists today, explicitly or not, use a middle-range-like 
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construct to sustain inferences and, in so doing, display what Wylie calls 
mitigated objectivism: Observations made on archaeological deposits are 
not only recognized as theory-laden (a point of challenge offered by rela-
tivists to processual archaeology), but in fact they are, it is to be hoped 
(Chippendale 2000), deliberately laden with theory that is both relevant yet 
analytically independent of the ideas of the past under investigation. 
Middle-range theory as a term was first used by sociologist Robert 
Merton (1968) to describe linkages between primary sociological obser-
vations (made in what archaeologists understand as the systemic context) 
and higher-level grand theory (Raab and Goodyear 1984). As noted by 
Raab and Goodyear (1984), Shott (1998), and Binford (1983:18-19), this 
usage of the term is very different from the methodological sense of 1970s 
Binfordian middle-range theory, which links up the material archaeological 
record and interpretations of those materials. Raab and Goodyear (1984) 
argue for terminological precision and suggest renaming Binford's middle-
range theory as "archaeological theory." Shott offers a similar argument, 
suggesting "formational theory," since in his eyes Binfordian middle-range 
theory seems to pertain most to how archaeological deposits were formed. 
Both advocate retaining the Mertonian sense of middle-range theory for 
linking between reconstructed primary observation units (derived from the 
application of archaeological or formational theory) and general theory. 
RECENT INNOVATIONS 
Over the last 10 years, archaeologists from widely divergent theoretical 
stances have offered several different ways to both solve Meno's Puzzle and 
subvert Merlin's subterfuge. In structure, all of these routes appear very 
similar, as demonstrated by Wylie's analyses of the evolutionary archae-
ology (Wylie 1995) and feminist archaeology (Wylie 1996) programs, 
Tshauner's (1996) comparison of behavioral and postprocessual archaeol-
ogy, and the admissions of Tilley (1994) and Trigger (1995). This single, 
widely employed escape consists of an inferential pyramid (Schiffer 1987, 
1988; Trigger 1989:20) in which upper-level abductions are situated in 
what Dunnell (1971; 1992) terms the ideational realm and are derived from 
many lower-level, independently grounded inferences based in the material 
realm. These latter primary inferences consist of both deductions and 
abductions and also rely on less secure inductions, generalizations, and 
conventions, all based in some sort of middle-range construct. 
The middle-range offerings of both Trigger (1995) and Tilley (1994) 
are significant because they represent some of the first attempts by those 
concerned with ideology and mentalist issues to acknowledge the critical 
role played by a middle-range construct in sustaining inferences about the 
past. Trigger seeks to extend a symbolic analogue into the past: 
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The study of these correlations requires a different kind of middle-range theory 
and different bridging arguments. This middle-range theory takes the form 
of demonstrations that certain kinds of beliefs and symbolism correspond 
significantly with specific types of societies. Hence, where these types of societies 
can be shown to have existed, the presence of specific beliefs or symbolism can 
be postulated with varying degrees of confidence. The strongest bridging ar-
guments take the form of evidence from written documents, oral traditions and 
ethnographic data which indicate that these beliefs were in fact present in the 
individual societies being considered [Trigger 1995:425]. 
Meanwhile, Tilley (1994) is interested in sustaining interpretations about 
the role of the landscape in the lives of past peoples. He surveys several 
ethnographically known cultures that had different degrees of economic 
and ideological complexity and generalizes from these few. 
To be expected of these pioneering efforts, they also represent some 
of the more naive examples of middle-range applications, relying as they do 
on simplistic ethnographic analogies that do not engage the full complexity 
of the matter at hand. Binford (1967) early on acknowledged the role of 
analogy in pointing out areas where middle-range research is required. That 
is, where Trigger and Tilley end their discussion of middle-range research, 
Binford might begin it. Following Cowgill's (1993) recommendations, 
fuller treatments would look beneath the surface of the offered general-
izations, perhaps to the contextual psychology of humans with respect to 
portable and landscape symbols. 
More recently, Hodder (1999) has offered an analysis of the archaeo-
logical interpretive process based on what archaeologists do as opposed to 
prescriptions about what they should do. He describes this process as a 
hermeneutic spiral; the reasoning process is recursive and iterative and 
constantly works between "the parts" and "the whole" at a variety of levels 
of abstraction. (The hermeneutic nature of archaeological interpretation is 
similarly evident in Wylie's discussions and in Binford's [1977b:7] early 
discussions of middle-range theory as well as O'Connell's (1995) critique 
of ethnoarchaeology.). Archaeological inference in this process has sev-
eral characteristics (Table 11.1) and depends very much on the pre-
understandings of the researcher, which I understand as the various aspects 
of the paradigm (Kuhn 1970; Masterman 1970; Wilk 1985) within which a 
researcher works. Hodder argues that in fact archaeologists do not "test 
hypotheses," as early positivist New Archaeologists prescribed, but rather 
they constantly evaluate the degree of fit between data and interpretation. 
These best-fit interpretations (Kelley and Hanen 1988:360-368) I under-
stand to be what is meant by abductions (Blackburn 1994). 
The hermeneutic nature of archaeological reasoning lies in how ar-
chaeological observation proceeds. "[T]he definition of [archaeological] ob-
jects [such as artifacts and features] depends on interpretations of contexts 
BODIES OF REFERENCE KNOWLEDGE AND INFERENCE 321 
Table 11.1 Characteristics of Archaeological Inference (Hodder 1999: 33-65) 
1. Depends on the integration of parts into wholes, with all strands of evidence 
supporting the coherent whole 
2. Works by analogy and comparison (example, ethnographic analogy) 
3. Depends on pre-understandings, including the initial definition of object of study, 
criteria to identify which facts are significant; goal of inquiry and notions about 
what will count as an answer; tools; methods and skills; social structure of 
research team; wider social, political, and funding context 
4. Is data-led in that discovery is a crapshoot and may deny previously held pre-
understandings 
5. Method is interpretation dependent with different kinds of archaeological deposits 
approached in different ways 
6. Depends on anticipated narratives 
7. Is multiple and diverse depending on pre-understandings of the archaeologist and 
the disciplines (natural science, social science, and humanities) that archaeology 
straddles 
8. Lack of coherent whole produces tensions, leading to further research 
9. The fit of data to interpretation is made at several levels, by the researcher and by 
the community to which researcher reports 
and definition of contexts depends on interpretation of objects" (Hodder 
1999:86, Figure 5.2). And, after Kosso (1991:625), Hodder (1999:27-28) 
describes middle-range theory as a hermeneutic tool. 
Theories ... in general are confirmed by appeal to observations, and observa-
tions in general are understood and verified with the support of theories. 
Observations are theoretically influenced claims about specific situations. 
Theories are claims which go beyond particular perceptions of observations. 
Individual observations are interpreted by appeal to theories which are 
themselves put together and supported by observations. 
Downplayed in this presentation is the notion that middle-range constructs, 
while subjectively recruited to meet a particular task, are nevertheless 
employed in an analytically independent manner (Binford 1981; Lucas 
2001:183-187; Wylie 1996). Data collected and interpreted with them 
may, in the parlance of some, resist particular interpretations. Moreover, as 
discussed below, some middle-range constructs are more than analogs 
(contra Hodder's Characteristic 2) and yield inferences that are more robust 
than those produced through induction. Given these observations, it would 
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seem useful to modify Hodder's Figure 5.2 to reflect that data are consti-
tuted and interpreted using these analytically independent hermeneutic 
tools presented as bodies of reference knowledge (discussed below) in 
Figure ILL 
While others have finally admitted the essential role of a middle-range-
like construct for making knowledge claims about the past, Binford (2001a, 
2001 b) has characteristically moved on to offer another important dis-
tinction. He retains in the toolbox of the archaeological enterprise some-
thing akin to what he early on discussed as middle-range theory: 
The challenge facing archaeological researchers is to decide which properties of 
our observational events can be linked most securely to events that occurred in 
the past. Since all arguments about what the past was like are based on 
circumstantial evidence, they must be judged by how well they link observations 
in the present to dynamic events inferred from such evidence. Only strong 
arguments of causal necessity are acceptable [Binford 2001a:46J. 
To this Binford adds another critical interpretive tool, however, which 
is how knowledge claims can begin to be made for that myriad of situations 
wherein multiple contingent factors come into play in determining human 
behavior and also the consequent material record. It is this complexity that 
has caused other researchers to either continue with flawed but rich eth-
nographic analogical reasoning, often ignoring interesting variation. Bin-
ford's most recent offering is a strategy for generating interpretative 
homologues tied to very particular conditions through inductive inspection 
Ideas (theories, 
models, etc.) Inferences 
FIGURE I I. I Archaeological hermeneutic enterprise. 
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of multiple cases arrayed against better understood dimensions of potential 
variation. It is a strategy for transiting from the complex known into the 
complex unknown. He illustrates this strategy by arraying ethnographically 
documented hunter-gatherer cases against various well-understood dimen-
sions of climatic variation. As the volume Constructing Frames demon-
strates, for this work to proceed requires an incredible investment in 
recruiting and organizing prior knowledge about climate and about eth-
nographically known hunter-gatherers. 
While Binford's current work especially concerns interpretation of 
second- and third-order archaeological patterning, earlier work applied the 
same strategy to assist interpretation of first-order archaeological pattern-
ing in bone distributions informed by knowledge of how carcasses are 
differentially utilized and transported (Binford 1987a). Another example 
illustrates: Stone can be knapped in a limited number of ways, all described 
by fracture mechanics (seated in Newtonian physics). Knapping, however, 
may take different trajectories depending on various conditions. Thus the 
character of chipped stone assemblages reflects the degree to which tech-
nology is curated or expedient (Binford 1977a), with maintained or reliable 
tools kits (Bleed 1986), designed to manage time or material constraints 
(Torrence 1983), with close or distant raw material sources (Nelson 1991), 
and accumulating over years or centuries (Holdaway and Fanning 2003). 
Current chipped stone analysis employs Binford's frame of reference 
strategy, attempting to monitor assemblage variation with respect to each 
of these potential sources of variation. Actual measurements made on 
debitage and tools (i.e., first-order observations on archaeological materi-
als) feed this constrained and contextualized multidimensional analysis. 
Binford gave a label-middle-range theory-to an inescapable step in 
archaeological interpretation that has long been employed by archae-
ologists. His most recent emphasis on frames of reference similarly gives a 
label to an analytic strategy that until now has been unnamed but is used by 
those researchers working with archaeological variation. The importance 
of the analytic strategy detailed by Binford cannot be overemphasized. Thus 
the development and application of uncontextualized middle-range con-
structs is insufficient, especially for approaching the complex and contin-
gent human past. The inductive strategy outlined by Binford, informed by 
prior knowledge and particular contexts, appears to be the best solution for 
how to proceed. 
Hodder (1999) notes the importance of pre-understandings in archae-
ological interpretation but uses the one term as an umbrella for all aspects of 
pre-understanding and prejudgment that inform archaeological work, from 
inception to final interpretation. Binford's important contribution here, in 
his emphasis on prior knowledge and frames of references, is that there are 
some pre-understandings that can and should be usefully cultivated by the 
researcher. We cannot control the social milieu in which a researcher is 
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raised, although she can be made aware of it. We can, however, fashion 
particular hermeneutic tools that are sensitive to the issue at hand. 
Except for confusing students, the discipline has gotten along just fine 
using a surfeit of terms-archaeological theory, archaeological correlates, 
middle-range theory, middle-range research, source-side knowledge, mid-
level theory, formation theory, and potentially, frames of reference-to 
describe a critical portion of the archaeological interpretive enterprise. 
Nevertheless, in what follows, I introduce and attempt to justify the utility 
of yet another term, body of reference knowledge, which offers various 
merits over current terms. I detail the dimensional nature of such bodies 
and the modes of argument that involve the application of bodies of ref-
erence knowledge of different kinds. 
BODIES OF REFERENCE KNOWLEDGE AND THEIR DIMENSIONS 
By "body of reference knowledge," I refer to a more or less coherent corpus 
of knowledge, sometimes developed in other disciplines, recruited by ar-
chaeologists to address particular archaeological problems. The proposed 
addition to the archaeological lexicon offers several advantages. For one, the 
term body of reference knowledge (BORK) allows us to admit that some 
of the bodies of reference knowledge on which we commonly rely are 
not always theoretically secure, contra the terms "archaeological theory," 
"middle-range theory," and "formational theory." For example, Shott 
(1996, 1998) admits that the documented relationship between size and use 
life of ceramic vessels at this point is correlative rather than theoretically 
supported (meaning, we know when and under what circumstances a par-
ticular relationship holds). Nevertheless, he feels confident that it can be 
used in an instrumental capacity to support inferences about ceramic as-
semblage composition. Similarly, as noted above, while Trigger (1995) has 
proposed expanding "middle-range theory" to deal with iconographic 
phenomenon, the middle-range theory he proposes is really an analogical 
application of an empirical generalization and at present lacks theoretical 
undergirding. The theoretical content of a body of reference knowledge is 
critical for it speaks to the security of inference; it is but one property to be 
considered here. 
Second, the term "bodies of reference knowledge" gives a name to a 
critical element in the archaeological enterprise so that we can dim en-
sionalize it (see below), and discuss and debate it. In his extended discussion 
of middle-range theory, Lucas (2001: 186-187) uses the term "middle-range 
research" in this capacity. Yet, other authors (e.g., Grayson 1986) use this 
same term with other senses. Thus, in pursuit of a vocabulary that is ever 
more precise, I suggest referring to this entity as a body of reference 
knowledge. 
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Third, "body of reference knowledge" avoids the issue of Mertonian 
precedence in use of the term middle-range theory as raised by Raab and 
Goodyear (1984) and Shott (1998). Fourth, while Shott sees such tools as 
being useful in understanding the formation of the archaeological record-
hence his term "formational theory"-Clarke (1973), Sullivan (1978), and 
Schiffer (1988) recognize a more expanded domain of application, with 
which I concur. The important point here is that this source-side knowl-
edge, both archaeological and nonarchaeological, exists and that we 
archaeologists organize and apply it to enable interpretation. 
Bodies of reference knowledge are used in establishing primary units 
of archaeological observation as well as secondary and tertiary units of 
analysis in inferring that particular processes have occurred or that par-
ticular conditions have obtained (Figure 11.1). Their development and use 
takes into account: the nature of a specific archaeological record (e.g., 
comprised of chipped stone? architecture? both? other?); the ideas, inchoate 
or not (Ramenofsky and Steffen 1998), to be examined archaeologically; 
and the kinds of secondary and tertiary units that will be utilized to engage 
those ideas (using a comparative analytic strategy and employing other 
bodies of reference knowledge). 
Dimensions 
Not all bodies of reference knowledge are equal, and consequently the 
inferential process (that is, how they are used by archaeologists) varies 
depending on the nature of the developed and applied BORK. BORKs can 
be mapped along several general dimensions (Table 11.2). 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONDITION/PROCESS AND PATTERN. The first 
dimension, with three aspects, focuses on the relationship between the 
condition or process we ultimately hope to infer and archaeologically ob-
servable material patterns. First, regarding whether the process-pattern 
relationship is "instantaneous" or emergent, consider the irrigation net-
work constructed in Uruk, Mesopotamia (Adams 1981). Its presence sug-
gests that multiple families are in simultaneous residence, that seasonal 
water shortages are likely that limited the productivity of some preferred 
crops, and that some modest or even highly developed degree of communal 
organization is in place to coordinate its construction and regulate its use. 
The presence of an irrigation system on the Euphrates River at 4600 B.C., 
then, indicates the presence of the above-described conditions, at least at 
the instant in time of the canal's construction. 
At the other end of the continuum are patterns that result from pro-
cesses operating or conditions obtaining over a span of time. The devel-
opment of size-sorted assemblages by water occurs after some passage of 
time (Wood and Johnson 1978), albeit, archaeologically speaking, brief. 
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Table 11.2 Dimensions of Bodies of Reference Knowledge 
I. Relationship between condition/process and pattern 
a. instantaneous/emergent pattern 
b. uniquely determined/ambiguous 
c. single vs. multiple factors 
2. Understanding of relationship 
a. theoretical vs. empirical 
b. comprehensiveness 
3. Application 
a. breadth (universaVcontextual) 
b. warrantability (uniformitarianistic warrant, assumption) 
c. mode (identification, deductive, inductive inference) 
Similarly, the development of assemblages differentially rich in bifaces or 
cores develops as a result of the history of occupation responsible for those 
assemblages (Bamforth and Becker 2000), perhaps over centuries. 
To some extent, whether the process-pattern relationship is instanta-
neous or emergent is a matter of scale of observation. In fact, an irrigation 
system cannot be built in an instant and is likely something that emerges 
over years or decades, although for it to have functioned at all, much of 
it must have existed simultaneously. The simple point here is that, as ex-
pounded upon by Bailey (Bailey 1981, 1983, 1987), different processes 
have different temporalities, and our ability to see them archaeologically is 
thus affected by how much time has indeed passed as assemblages develop. 
This issue requires its own treatment and will not be elaborated upon 
further here (Wandsnider 2004a, 2004b). 
Second, is the condition/process-pattern relationship a necessary, de-
termined one, with one unique process giving rise to one unique pattern? 
Or, may a particular process have, contextually, several different well-
determined archaeological outcomes? Similarly, is the pattern an equifinal 
one, for which many different processes may be responsible? 
The relationship between radiocarbon decay (a process) and the 
resulting pattern, distinctive amounts of 14C and 12C, is perhaps the clearest 
example of an unambiguous, necessary relationship between process and 
pattern (Taylor 1997). As we understand it, radioactive forms of carbon are 
unstable, and the probability that they emit gamma particles within a 
certain time frame is described by a probability distribution. At least in this 
universe and given the atmospheric conditions present on the earth's 
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surface today, radioactive carbon must behave this way. Even this rela-
tionship, however, is subject to various contingencies, with different pat-
terns resulting. For example, whether the sample is carbonized wood versus 
bone versus shell; whether it is derived from the Northern or Southern 
Hemisphere; whether the calibration curve is complex for a particular ra-
diocarbon time range, and so on, do not affect the form of the relationship 
but do affect the application of the BORK to interpret particular samples. 
Thus, inferences about sample age are often well determined-we have 
good information about when radioactive carbon was no longer emplaced 
in the sample. However, multiple inferences may follow, and the associated 
error terms may be either large or small. 
On the other hand, Binford (1987a), Kneebone (1990), and Schiffer 
(1988) have argued that the degree of spatial structure in archaeological 
deposits is tied to the amount of energy being expended in that space. That 
is, with more people, more activities, more enduring items, less space, etc., 
more nonrandom structure should be seen (Wandsnider 1996). Binford 
(1978a, 1987a) notes, however, that the relationship between energy den-
sity and spatial structure is highly contextual. That is, how a single nuclear 
family structures its space and activities within that space may be qualita-
tively different from how an extended family, several cooperating families, 
or a same-sex task group might organize exactly the same activities in 
exactly the same amount of space. Thus, we should expect no simple re-
lationship between archaeologically observed structure and group size, 
activity kind, and so forth. Again, we have what is likely a well-determined 
relationship that is expressed slightly differently depending on vanous 
contingencies that are perhaps difficult to establish. 
RELATIONSHIP UNDERSTANDING. A second dimension deals with what we 
in the systemic world know about the BORK process-pattern relationship. 
Two aspects are relevant here: the degree to which the relationship is the-
oretically or empirically understood, and the comprehensiveness of the 
understanding. 
With a rich theoretical understanding of the relationship, we can ex-
plain how and why a particular relationship holds and, equally important, 
the conditions under which it does not hold. Newtonian physics explains 
the behavior of unstable isotopes at the earth's surface in our post-Big Bang 
world and allows us to relate patterns in specific isotope frequencies to the 
process of radioactive decay. In turn, this body of reference knowledge has 
been recruited for use as a dating tool by archaeologists, to learn when the 
14e isotope was last emplaced by an organism. 
In contrast, a pattern-process relationship may be empirically well es-
tablished but not well understood. Trigger's (1995) observations on sym-
bols employed within complex societies stands as a provocative empirical 
relationship that can even now be used in an instrumental capacity. But 
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since we are unsure of why and when the relationship holds, we risk the 
possibility of making interpretative errors. Byers's (1999) symbolic prag-
matics offers a body of theory within which Trigger's very strong pattern 
may become explainable, as may the body of theory currently under de-
velopment by biologists and others to explain the contexts within which 
wasteful advertising (Neiman 1997) or costly signaling occurs. 
Completeness or comprehensiveness of the understanding of the 
pattern-process relationship is also critical. Part of Cyrus Thomas's (1985: 
627-631) evaluation of the evidence for the authorship of prehistoric North 
American mounds depended on a botanical body of reference knowledge 
and observations of trees with 800 rings growing on mounds. He finds the 
botanical BORK that equates one tree ring with one year of growth to be 
not well substantiated and thus questions the maximum age of the mounds 
(800 years) determined using this BORIC 
Similarly, selectionist archaeologists have relied on incompletely spec-
ified pattern-process relationships to infer that particular evolutionary 
processes have occurred. Assuming for the moment that one can estab-
lish that material forms comprise a lineage in which heritable traits are 
passed to subsequent generations-no small matter-then trait frequencies 
through time are the pattern to be interpreted. ror example, Beck (1998) 
finds distinctive patterns in projectile point attributes frequencies through 
time, which she argues reflect either selection or drift. But other processes 
may also be at work, and to date a case has not been made that a particular 
pattern necessarily refers to either selection or drift exclusively. 
INFERENCES, APPLYING BORKS. A third dimension is the application of a 
particular BORK to a particular set of archaeological observations. In 
discussing the scope of application, the concern is with how narrow or wide 
that scope is (both theoretically and technically), the degree to which we 
can warrant that a particular BORK is relevant to a set of archaeological 
observations, and how inference is actually sustained. 
The scope of application may be either very broad or very narrow. The 
body of Newtonian physical theory that describes the behavior of fission-
able carbon isotopes has a very wide, almost universal scope of application. 
We assume that this body of theory describes carbon isotope decay rates 
both today and in the distant past, indeed, even as far back as until just after 
the Big Bang. Technically, the scope of application is more narrow than 
that, since some of the values of the parameters describing that theory have 
been impacted since the 1940s by nuclear testing. Moreover, the half-life of 
radioactive carbon is small enough that this BORK is only useful on carbon 
samples emplaced within last 100,000 years. And, there is also evidence 
that suggests that parameter values within this body of theory may be 
different for the Southern and Northern Hemispheres, as the circulation of 
carbon within each hemisphere is slightly different. 
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Establishing the relevancy of this BORK to archaeological situations 
depends on establishing several parameters: (a) that it comes from a non-
contaminated pre-1940s archaeological context, (b) that some 14e is still 
present, and (c) the hemisphere from which the sample comes. If the sample 
satisfies these conditions, the carbon isotope BORK is considered relevant 
and applicable and may be used to infer the age at death of the organism 
from which the sample is derived. 
Other BORKs are decidedly more narrow in their scope of application 
or specify a series of narrow situations in which a particular relationship 
holds. For example, in From Bones to Behavior (Hudson 1993), authors 
discuss the various conditions under which rational humans transport 
bones from kill sites. Similarly, dietary breadth and other optimal foraging 
models describe well particular choices for particular configurations of 
currencies, time frame, species, and so forth. As different circumstances or 
conditions obtain, then so do different decisions and choices. Archaeolog-
ically, the challenge is several-fold. The archaeological signatures of several 
processes may be equifinal, or may require establishing that particular 
circumstances in fact occurred, which may be difficult or impossible. As 
well, archaeological assemblages are time-averaged, meaning that the pat-
tern we find is likely owed to several distinctive but unresolvable processes. 
Inference is the process of moving from acceptance of some proposi-
tions to acceptance of others (Blackburn 1994). In archaeological reason-
ing, four modes of inference or BORK application are evident depending on 
the nature of the BORK. Identification (Binford 1981) refers to inference by 
simple pattern-matching of essential characteristics between modern and 
past samples. If a pollen grain has two large air bladders, it meets the 
morphological criteria to be identified as a Pinus species pollen grain. For a 
bone specimen to be identified as a deer humerus, it must meet other 
morphological criteria. Through experience, BORKs of entities and their 
essential characteristics have been developed. Identification proceeds with 
barely a hiccup when natural entities (plant and animal species, minerals) 
that have essential properties are involved, although see instances when 
evolved species are discussed, as for the behavior of Bison antiquus. Iden-
tification as a kind of formal analogy also occurs when identifying artifacts 
and features that have characteristics essential to a particular function, such 
as smelting (Kelley and Hanen 1988:360-368). 
Deduction refers to inferences that follow from a set of premises. In 
archaeology, deductions are possible when a pattern-process BORK de-
scribes an unambiguous (or nearly so) and theoretically understood rela-
tionship. The age of a charcoal sample can be deduced because the half-life 
of radioactive carbon is known, as is the theory that explains the process of 
radioactive decay and the factors that condition it. Hence, technical matters 
relating to age determination are also known, and we have developed the 
technology to measure even small quantities of 14e. The age of a sample, if 
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no contamination can be argued, is necessarily determined. Deductive 
inferences are very robust but also very limited. As emphasized by archae-
ologists specializing in chronometrics, a radiocarbon (or dendrochronology 
or obsidian hydration, etc.) date specifies the age of the sample and the event 
that produced that sample, which mayor may not be the event of interest. 
BORKs that have very narrow scopes of application may also be ap-
plied deductively if the context can be established. Rogers (lOOO) discusses 
how the agents responsible for attrition in a bone assemblage can be di-
agnosed using a probability model based in experience. 
Induction, or reasoning by analogy, refers to reasoning to empirical 
conclusions from empirical premises through extension or projection rather 
than necessary entailment. In general, BORKS that deal with human be-
havior are applied inductively rather than deductively because human be-
havior is highly contextual and situational, and it is difficult or impossible 
to establish that context archaeologically for individual cases. For example, 
Watson and Kennedy (1991) infer that in eastern North America, women 
were proximately responsible for domesticating plants. This inference is 
based on a body of reference knowledge derived from ethnographic ac-
counts of the labor; in general, women in ethnographically known societies 
assume primary responsibility for plant harvesting and manipulation. Why 
this strong pattern is the case and why exceptions occur likely have to do 
with societal gender dynamics and the division of labor and knowledge, but 
as far as I am aware, this body of reference knowledge has not so far been 
developed in this direction. Were a theoretical BORK describing the divi-
sion of labor and knowledge to be developed, it might be possible to make 
more secure deductions about past manipulators of plants. Because of the 
possibility that a contemporary empirical pattern, specified in a BORK, has 
been incorrectly imposed to interpret an archaeological deposit, inductive 
inferences are generally considered suspect. 
Finally, abduction refers to reasoning to the best interpretation with the 
data at hand. As described by Hodder (1999), data coherence and corre-
spondence, embedded as they are in BORKs that are conventional, empirical, 
or theoretical, is important, as is parsimony. Typically, many strands of 
evidence (Wylie 1989a), supported by many different BORKs, are employed. 
CONCLUSION 
Bodies of reference knowledge are hermeneutic tools deliberately built and 
used by archaeologists in escaping Meno's Puzzle and in exposing Merlin's 
subterfuge. They are inescapable for establishing primary, secondary, and 
tertiary units of archaeological observation as well as in inferring that par-
ticular processes have occurred. Their development and use takes into ac-
count the nature of a specific archaeological record, the ideas to be examined 
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archaeologically, and the kinds of secondary and tertiary units that will be 
utilized to engage those ideas (using a comparative, frames of reference, 
analytic strategy and employing other bodies of reference knowledge). 
One of the many contributions of Lewis Binford to archaeology is the 
isolation of the concepts of middle-range theory and frames of reference, 
thereby making these elements of the archaeological enterprise research-
able. I suggest here that it is useful to consider both middle-range theory 
and frames of reference as different kinds of bodies of reference knowledge. 
More generally, such bodies can be usefully mapped along a number of 
independent dimensions, including the process-pattern relationship itself, 
our knowledge of the process-pattern relationship, and BORK application. 
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